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COMMENT
Stansbury v. Maupin: KENTUCKY'S REFUSAL TO
RECOGNIZE LEGISLATIVE HOME RULE FOR
FIRST CLASS CITIES
INTRODUCTION

Home rule for cities, although an ancient concept,' was
not adopted in Kentucky until 1972.2 In a recent decision,3
the Supreme Court of Kentucky effectively, though unintentionally, dealt a potentially fatal blow to the state's still
fledgling home rule doctrine. In Stansbury v. Maupin, the
Court held that the Board of Aldermen of the City of Louisville did not have "the authority to issue a subpoena to assist
an investigation into the conduct of a mayor.' 4 In arriving at
its decision, the Court determined that the state statute which
expressly provided for the removal of a mayor from office 5 did
not expressly give the Board of Aldermen the power to issue
subpoenas in pre-hearing investigations carried out by a committee and that this "authority to subpoena witnesses and
compel them to give evidence is too powerful, and too susceptible of abuse, to be implied in the absence of utter
necessity."8
The Court, in its reluctance to extend the right of
subpoena to a local governmental unit7 without express au-

I For a discussion of the historical roots

of home rule in England, see 1 C. AN-

TIEAU, MUNICIPAL CORPORATION LAW § 3.00 (1975) [hereinafter cited as ANTEAU].
2 The home rule legislation begins with a statement of legislative intent in Ky.
REV. STAT. § 83.410 (1980) [hereinafter cited as KRS].
3Stansbury v. Maupin, 599 S.W.2d 170 (Ky. 1980).
Id. at 171.

KRS § 83.660 (1980).
599 S.W.2d at 171.
7 The Court commented: "It occurs to us that the various towns and cities of
Kentucky have functioned for quite some time without the help of the subpoena
power." Id. at 172.
'
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thorization from the Legislature,8 completely overlooked the
real issue: whether the Kentucky Home Rule Act, with its
broad grant of power, empowers the Louisville Board of Aldermen to issue subpoenas. The issue arises out of the Legislature's extension to first class cities "the authority to govern
themselves to the full extent required by local government.""
The Act further provides that a Board of Aldermen is given
all the power necessary to govern a city "to the same extent
and with the same force and effect as if the general assembly
had granted and delegated to the legislative body of the city
all of the authority and powers that are within its powers to
grant to a municipal corporation as if expressly enumerated
herein." 10
The Court summarily dismissed the issue presented by
this language. This comment will demonstrate that the Court
erred in its analysis by disregarding the real source of the
Board of Aldermen's right to grant the subpoena power to its
committee and will suggest' that in so doing it effectively
emasculated the long-awaited Home Rule Act.

I.

THE

Stansbury v. Maupin PROBLEM

The events giving rise to the issues addressed by the Supreme Court in Stansbury were set in motion in the summer
of 1978. The Board of Aldermen of the City of Louisville
(Board) was concerned that the Mayor of Louisville, William
B. Stansbury, had misused his office and, in particular, had
misappropriated public funds for his own use.11 Although the
Board could have held a removal hearing pursuant to state
statute,12 the majority of its members felt that an investigaId.
9 KRS § 83.410 (1980).
10 KRS § 83.520 (1980).
8

" Letter from Laurence J. Zielke, Director of Law, City of Louisville to Robert
F. Stephens, Attorney General of Kentucky (Aug. 3, 1978) [hereinafter cited as Zielke
Letter], reprintedin Op. Ky. Att'y Gen. 78-533 (unpublished, Aug. 8, 1978) [hereinafter cited as Op. Att'y Gen.].
2 KRS § 83.660 (1980) provides:
(1) Unless otherwise provided by law, executive and ministerial officers of
the city may be removed by the board of aldermen, sitting as a court, under
oath,.. . in case of charges against the mayor, upon charges preferred by
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tion should be made to determine the facts of the situation
before they embarked upon such a drastic course of action.
The Board therefore passed a resolution creating a select committee charged with investigating "all matters concerning
abuses by the Office of the Mayor and possible misuses of the
Office to include the spending of public funds."13
A. Attorney General's Opinion
After the Board gave first reading to the resolution, it instructed the Director of Law for the City of Louisville, Laurence J. Zielke, to determine the extent of the Board's power
to issue subpoenas in furtherance of the select committee's investigation. Mr. Zielke requested an opinion on the matter
from Attorney General Robert F. Stephens.1 '
The Attorney General's Opinion declared that the Board
did not have an inherent subpoena power as a consequence of
its legislative investigative capacity because such power must
be specifically given by statute.15 The opinion examined that
portion of the Home Rule Act expressly dealing with removal
of executive and ministerial officers by the Board of Aldermen1 6 and determined that this legislation only authorizes the
subpoena power for the Board as a necessary implication in
connection with a removal hearing and does not authorize
such power in connection with a prior investigative hearing.
not less than five (5) members of the board of aldermen. No alderman preferring charges shall sit as a member of the board of aldermen when it tries
that charge.
Id.
13

Zielke Letter, supra note 11

14 Id.
" As support for the proposition that the authority to issue subpoenas must be
expressly granted, the Attorney General's Opinion cited 1 AM. JuR. Administrative
Law § 91 (1962), which deals with the power of an administrative body to subpoena
witnesses. Although the Board does at times take on the character of an administrative body, it was not seeking to issue this subpoena as an administrative body, but
rather it was acting in its role as an investigative legislative body. That legislative
bodies acting in an investigative capacity have implied subpoena powers has been
recognized on the federal level for Congress since McGrain v. Daugherty, 273 U.S. 135
(1927). Thus the question the Attorney General should have addressed was whether
the McGrain rationale applied to a local legislative body. The courts subsequently
addressed this question, but the Attorney General inexplicably ignored it.

16KRS § 83.660 (1980).
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The opinion then concluded that the "general rule is that in
absence of specific statutory authority
to issue subpoenas or
'17
administer oaths, none exists.

In analyzing the question of whether the home rule legislation gives the city the subpoena power incident to the broad
delegation of power in Kentucky Revised Statutes (KRS) sections 83.41018 and 83.520,19 the opinion cited that portion of
the legislation which states that the delegated powers must
not be in conflict with "the statutes of the state.

' 20

It con-

cluded that because the Legislature "also enacted a specific
statute governing the investigation and removal of executive
and ministerial officers pursuant to KRS § 83.360 [sic] . . .
any attempt by ordinance (pursuant to home rule authority),
to go beyond, be broader than, add to or modify the powers
specifically given under this statute would be in conflict therewith and therefore invalid.

21

Thus, the Attorney General

took the position that since the state statute providing for a
hearing to remove a mayor did not provide for an investigation prior to the hearing, any ordinance that authorized a subpoena power for such an investigative hearing would automatically be in conflict with the state statute.
Under the Attorney General's approach, the removal statute is to be interpreted as covering all possible aspects of the
removal procedure. This implies that whenever the state legislature has enacted legislation on any aspect of a subject, the
city is prohibited from enacting resolutions dealing with any
other aspects of the same subject. 22 In other words, resolu7

Op. Att'y Gen., supra note 11, at 3.

Is KRS § 83.410 (1980) is entitled: "Legislative finding and expression of legislative intent."
19 KRS § 83.520 (1980) is entitled: "Board of aldermen-Powers-Tax levy
-Other statutory provisions."
2 The opinion specifically stated: "[h]owever pursuant to KRS 83.410, it is provided that such power is given where it is not in conflict with the constitution or
statutes of the state or the United States." Op. Att'y Gen., supra note 11, at 4.
21 Id. (emphasis added).
22 This analysis is known as the "pre-emption" doctrine or the "occupied field"
approach, meaning that once the state has acted on any aspect of a subject, the city
may not regulate the subject in any manner. This can lead to ridiculous results. An
example given by the Oregon Supreme Court is that of fire departments. Although
the state has a legitimate interest in the safety of all its citizens and can clearly regu-
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tions clearly supplemental to state legislation and not in opposition to it would nonetheless be prohibited. 2 3 As an analysis of home rule legislation will show, 24 this approach is clearly
inconsistent with the legislative intent to provide cities with
broad delegations of power.2 5
B.

The Path Through the Courts

The genesis of the Stansbury case may be traced to
Mayor Stansbury's refusal to comply with the select committee's request to produce certain materials pertaining to its investigation. The Board thereafter enacted an ordinance, over
the Mayor's veto, giving the committee the power to subpoena
documents and witnesses in connection "with any investigation, committee meeting or public hearing by the Board of
Aldermen, or a duly constituted committee thereof .... 1-26
The Mayor then sought an injunction from the Jefferson Circuit Court to prevent the Board from exercising the subpoena
power in its investigation.27 Although the circuit court judge
based his decision on the home rule legislation, he completely
late cities through fire prevention codes, under the pre-emption doctrine, because the
state has instituted such regulations, the city would have no authority to prescribe
even the color of the firemen's uniforms. This result is rationalized under the theory
that once the state "entered the field" any action by the city would be "in conflict"
with the state legislation. City of La Grande v. Public Emp. Retirement Bd., 576 P.2d
1204 (Or. 1978).
23 To preclude the adoption of a pre-emption doctrine by the courts in Iowa, the
following statute was enacted: "An exercise of a city power is not inconsistent with a
state law unless it is irreconcilable with the state law." IOWA CODE ANN. § 364.2(3)
(1975).
2 See notes 78-86 infra and accompanying text for an analysis of home rule
legislation.
25The dangers of the pre-emption doctrine to home rule have been articulated
by one commentator as follows:
Pre-emption should be upheld with caution. If a single enactment containing no expression or inference of legislative intent as to the scope of its
application is held to preclude all municipal action in a particular area, the
effect will be to limit severely municipal action, and will render any form of
home rule worthless.
Moser, County Home Rule-Sharing the State's Legislative Power with Maryland
Counties, 28 MD.L. REv. 327, 351 (1968).

29599 S.W.2d at 171.
27Stansbury v. Maupin, No. 78-CI-07451 (Jeff. Cir. Ct. Sept. 18, 1978) (order
granting temporary injunction).
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misinterpreted this legislation. In fact, as one commentator
later observed, the judge "totally missed the point of home
rule."2 The judge also looked to the legislation on removal to
determine whether it expressly or impliedly granted the subpoena power. The judge found neither an express nor an implied grant and concluded that the Board did not have the
authority to confer the power upon the select committee. 20
The circuit judge, just as the Attorney General had previously
done, gave no weight to the statutory language granting the
Board all powers the Legislature could grant to a municipal
corporation "as if expressly enumerated herein."30
On appeal by the Board, the circuit court's decision was
reversed in part by the Court of Appeals of Kentucky.3 1 The
appellate court reversed the lower court judgment only insofar
as it enjoined the further expenditure of public funds for the
purpose of conducting the Stansbury probe. 2 In so doing the
Kentucky Court of Appeals avoided the home rule issue
altogether.,3 3
When the case finally reached the Supreme Court of Ken28

LEGISLATIVE RESEARCH

COMMISSION,

INFORMATIONAL BULLETIN

No. 138, THE

NEW MUNICIPAL LAW: KENTUCKY'S CrIEs UNDER HOME RULE 22 (1981) [hereinafter

cited as LRC INFo. BULL. No. 138].
29 Stansbury v. Maupin, No. 78-CI-07451 (Jeff. Cir. Ct., Nov. 21, 1978).
30 KRS § 83.520 (1980) (emphasis added).
11 Maupin v. Stansbury, 575 S.W.2d 695 (Ky. Ct. App. 1978).
32 Id. at 697. The court of appeals refused to disturb the lower court's injunction
in regard to the issuance of any subpoena. Id. That the Board does possess the subpoena power as a necessary concomitant of the investigatory and removal powers
granted by the Legislature is, however, implicit in the court's reasoning. See id. at
699.
The United States Supreme Court recognized that Congress possesses the subpoena power as a necessary implication of its power to investigate for legislative pur-

poses in McGrain. See note 15 supra for a discussion of this principle.
That state legislatures have a similar investigative capacity and thus a similar
need for the subpoena power has been recognized by state courts. See, e.g., Attorney
General v. Brissenden, 171 N.E. 82 (Mass. 1930) (sustaining legislative investigation

into the awarding of pensions in Boston police department); Hodde v. Superior
Court, 244 P.2d 668 (Wash. 1952) (sustaining subpoena of police captain to appear
before a committee of the Washington State Legislative Council). For an exhaustive

history of legislative investigations, see Eggers v. Kenny, 104 A.2d 10 (N.J. 1954).
22 The court of appeals noted in passsng that "although we express no opinion as
to the merits of this case, we do believe the uncontroverted allegations of this complaint raise serious questions as to the scope of Kentucky's Home Rule Act, K.R.S.
83.410 et seq." 575 S.W.2d at 699.
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tucky, the lower court decisions provided the groundwork for
that Court's misinterpretation of the problem. To better understand why the Supreme Court's reasoning is erroneous, a
clear understanding of the nature and purpose of the home
rule concept is essential.
II. THE

CONCEPT OF

HoME RULE

Although the concept of home rule has existed in the
United States for many decades, 4 it only recently became law
in Kentucky.3 5 One would think that since Kentucky has been
relatively slow in adopting home rule, the experiences of the
many states with long histories of home rule would serve as
guidelines for the interpretation of Kentucky's home rule statute. Unfortunately, this guidance is not available, for home
rule has evolved from different constitutional and/or legislative sources in the various states. This fact, coupled with divergent treatment within the various state courts, has resulted
in no two states treating home rule identically.38 However, the
experiences of other states can still be of some help in trying
to define the purpose and scope of home rule as intended by
the Kentucky Legislature.
A.

HistoricalBackground of Home Rule
Cities 37 have historically been viewed as creatures of the

31Missouri enacted the first home rule constitutional amendment in 1875. Mo.
CONST. art. IX, § 16 (1875). Under the present Missouri constitution this provision is
art. VI, § 19 (1945). For a discussion of the development of home rule in Missouri, see
Westbrook, Municipal Home Rule: An Evaluation of the Missouri Experience, 33
Mo. L. REv. 45 (1968).
31Cities of the first class, those cities with a population of 100,000 or more, were
given home rule powers by the General Assembly in 1972. See KRS § 83.410 (1980).
For a review of the historical route to home rule in Kentucky, see LRC INFO. BULL.
No. 138, supra note 28.
26 As one commentator notes: "[T]here is perhaps no term in the literature of
political science or law which is more susceptible to misconception and variety of
meanings than 'home rule."' Sandalow, The Limits of Municipal Power Under Home
Rule: A Role for the Courts, 48 MINN. L. REv. 643, 644 (1964).
37 Cities are also called municipal corporations. Generally "municipal corporation" is a term referring to "the traditional forms of local government having general
power over a locality, such as cities." ANTIEAU, supra note 1, at § 1.00. It has also
been applied, however, to "entities of local government organized not only for gen-
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state, 8 deriving their existence from the grace of the state.
With their existence dependent upon the state, it necessarily
followed that all of the cities' powers originated from the
state. 9 This notion resulted in a situation in which a city was
powerless to take any form of action not expressly authorized
by specific state legislation. 40 Because of increasing urbanization throughout the United States, problems arising from this
historical concept were inevitable. Each time a new problem
arose, no matter how urgent, the city government was compelled to go to the state legislature and request enabling legislation prior to taking action. 41 Not surprisingly, many states

saw the need to give at least the larger cities within their
boundaries a greater measure of self-control.
In 1875, Missouri became the first state to adopt a constitutional amendment providing for home rule.42 Most states
have followed Missouri's lead by effecting some degree of
home rule.43 The two basic means of establishing home rule
are self-executing constitutional provisions and legislative
provisions passed by a legislature pursuant to a constitutional
eral, but even for special purposes." Id. Thus counties and sewer districts may also be
referred to as municipal corporations. Throughout this comment, however, "cities"
and "municipal corporations" are used interchangeably.
"8For a detailed discussion of the creature theory, see B. HODES, LAw AND THE
MODERN CITY 33-51 (1937).
"' The creature theory was expressed by Judge Dillon in this manner:
The true view is this: Municipal corporations owe their origin to, and derive
their powers and rights wholly from the legislature. It breathes into them
the breath of life, without which they cannot exist. As it creates, so it may
destroy. If it may destroy, it may also abridge and control.
City of Clinton v. Cedar Rapids, 24 Iowa 455, 475 (1868).
40 This principle is called the Dillon Rule. See note 73 infra and accompanying
text for a more detailed discussion of this rule.
41 See B. HODES, supra note 38, wherein the author explains the need for home
rule for Chicago in 1937. Hodes points out the absurdity of a requirement of a grant
of express authority from a state legislature in order for a city to act on new issues by
citing New York City as a prime example. At that time, the population of the city was
7,154,000, while the population of the entire state of New York was only 12,965,000.
Even so, the system required the city to request express authority from the state
when faced with new issues. Id. at 17.
42 See note 34 supra for citations to the pertinent Missouri constitutional
provisions.
41 See Vanlandingham, Constitutional Municipal Home Rule Since the AMA
(NLC) Model, 17 Wm. & MARY L. REv. 1 n.9 (1975) [hereinafter cited as
Vanlandingham].
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provision."
Normally under the self-executing constitutional provisions, the constitution specifically gives cities the right to
draw up their own charters independent of any specific enabling legislation. 41 In states without self-executing provisions, 46 the source of the city's power for home rule is an enabling act 47 passed by the state legislature pursuant to a
constitutional provision4 8 allowing the legislature to make provisions for city government. It is this type of home rule legislation that is the basis for home rule in Kentucky. 49 Thus, it is
the Kentucky home rule statute that must be examined whenever any question arises as to the scope of the first class city
government's power. 50
The home rule provision, regardless of whether it is selfexecuting or legislative, may take two basic forms. The first
form, the imperium in imperio [hereinafter imperio] doctrine,
developed from the 1875 Missouri home rule provision which
provided that the city's charter must be "consistent with and
subject to the constitution and laws of the State."5 1 This was
4 AN AU,
4" Arizona,

supra note 1, at § 3.01.

California, Colorado, Idaho, Missouri, Nebraska, Ohio, Oklahoma,
Tennessee, Utah, Washington, and Wisconsin have self-executing constitutional provisions. Id.
46E.g., Georgia, Michigan, New Hampshire, New York, Pennsylvania, and West
Virginia. Id. at § 3.10.
47For example, Michigan's enabling legislation reads:
Each city may in its charter provide:
For the exercise of all municipal powers in the management and control of
municipal property and in the administration of the municipal government,
whether such powers be expressly enumerated or not; for any act to advance the interests of the city, the good government and prosperity of the
municipality and its inhabitants and through its regularly constituted authority to pass all laws and ordinances relating to its municipal concerns
subject to the constitution and general laws of this state.
MICH. Cop. LAws § 117.4j (1967).
48 KY.CONST. § 156 provides that the General Assembly shall have plenary power
over Kentucky cities. See LRC INFO. BUL.. No. 138, supra note 28, at 26-33 for a
detailed discussion of constitutional provisions affecting Kentucky cities.
4" The Kentucky home rule legislation is contained in KRS chapter 83 beginning
with § 83.410.
50Ky. CONST. § 156 classifies first class cities as those with populations of
100,000 or more. At present, Louisville is Kentucky's only first class city.
11Vanlandingham, supra note 43, at 1 n.1 (quoting Mo. CONsT. art. IX, § 16
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interpreted as meaning that the city had complete discretion
as to local matters, but that when state concerns were involved, state law would supersede any local law. Likewise,
when purely local concerns were involved, local law would supersede state law. Under this system the judiciary must necessarily play an important role, since it will frequently be called
upon to specify whether a particular function is local or state
in nature.5 2
The second form is often referred to as the NLC model,
because the National League of Cities originally proposed this
model for constitutional amendments or home rule legislation.
It provides a city with all powers that the legislature is capable of granting, except for those specifically withheld. The
model begins:
A municipal corporation which adopts a home rule charter
may exercise any power or perform any function which the
legislature has power to devolve upon a non-home rule charter municipal corporation by its home rule charter, is not
denied to all home rule charter municipal corporations by
statute, and is within such limitations as may be established
53
by statute.
Thus, under this form, a city is presumed to have a power if
the legislature had authority to give the city the power and
54
did not expressly withhold it.
B.

Home Rule in Kentucky
States have adopted several variations of both of these

(1875)).
52 Id. See also LRC INFO.

BULL. No. 138, supra note 28, at 16.

"AMERICAN

MUNICIPAL LEAGUE, MODEL CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS FOR MUNICIPAL HOME RULE 19 (1953).
" See, e.g., ALASKA CONST. art. X, § 11 (fproviding that a home rule city can
"exercise all legislative powers not prohibited by law or by charter"); MONT. CONST.

art. XI, § 6 (providing that a home rule city can "exercise any power not prohibited
by this constitution, law, or charter"); N. MEX. CONST. art. X, § 6D (providing that a
home rule city can "exercise all legislative powers and perform all functions not expressly denied by general law or charter"); PA. CONST. art 9, § 2 (providing that a
home rule city can "exercise any power or perform any function not denied"). See
also Vanlandingham, supra note 43, at 8 n.19.
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forms,5" and some states have incorporated both forms into
their home rule provisions. Kentucky has followed this latter
course and combined the two forms in its Home Rule Act.
The imperio provision appears in KRS section 83.410, which
gives first class cities "the authority to govern themselves to
the full extent required by local government and not in conflict with the constitution or laws of this state or by [sic] the
United States."56 The NLC type provision appears in KRS
section 83.520, wherein the Board is given powers to govern
the city
to the same extent and with the same force and effect as if
the general assembly had granted and delegated to the legislative body of the city all of the authority and powers that
are within its powers to grant to57 a municipal corporation as
if expressly enumerated herein.

Therefore, when a problem arises in Kentucky involving
the power of a first class city, there are two primary questions
that must be analyzed. First, in regard to the imperio provision, it must be determined whether the problem is purely a
local matter or whether it is one of statewide concern.5 8 Second, in regard to the provision based on the NLC model, it
must be determined whether the power that the city wishes to
exercise is expressly prohibited by a state statute.5 9 If the
51Arizona, California, Colorado, New York, Ohio, Oklahoma, and Oregon are
states where imperio home rule has been "at least moderately successful." Vanlandingham, supra note 43, at 27. Alaska, Massachusetts, New Mexico, and Pennsylvania
are operating under NLC model provisions. Id. at 9.
-6KRS § 83.410 (1980).
57 KRS § 83.520 (1980).
5' See C. RHYNE, MUNICIPAL LAW, § 403 (1957) for a categorization of certain
subjects as either municipal or state affairs. For example, opening and maintaining
streets, administration of local health affairs, and assessment and collection of street
paving costs have been held to be purely municipal affairs, while administration of
justice, creation of general legal rights, and administration of police and pension
funds have been held to be state affairs.
" This principle is widely recognized by courts in other states. See, e.g., Bechtel
v. City of Des Moines, 225 N.W.2d 326, 329 (Iowa 1975) (citing a recent amendment
to the constitution: "The rule ...

that a municipal corporation possesses ...

only

those powers granted in express words is not a part of the law of this state"); Corpus
Christi v. Continental Bus Sys., Inc., 445 S.W.2d 12, 16 (Tex. Civ. App. 1969) ("home
rule cities look to the acts of the legislature not for grants of power. . . but only for
limitations on their powers"); Beardsley v. City of Darlington, 111 N.W.2d 184, 186-
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matter is strictly local in nature and if the state legislature
has not expressly forbidden the city from exercising the
power, then the city has the power, and there is no need for
further analysis.6 0

III. THE Stansbury DECISION: WHERE THE SUPREME COURT
WENT WRONG
On appeal of the Stansbury case to the Supreme Court of
Kentucky, 1 that Court held that the Board did not possess
the subpoena power. The Court viewed the case as presenting
two questions: (1) whether a legislative body has the subpoena
power as a necessary implication of its investigative authority
and (2) whether the subpoena power was a necessary implication incident to the specific state statute providing for removal of the mayor by the Board. Like the court of appeals,
the Supreme Court gave cursory attention to the home rule
question and merely noted in one sentence: "We agree with
the Court of Appeals that KRS § 83.520, the city 'home rule'
act, does not include [the subpoena power]." 2
The Supreme Court obviously was quite concerned with
what it thought to be the crucial issue: implying the subpoena
power. It viewed the subpoena power as an awesome tool and
expressed great concern that such a powerful instrument
should ever be obtained without express legislative
authorization. s
87 (Wis. 1961) (holding that a city's powers "shall be limited only by express
language").
60 Ohio has adopted this test for analyzing its cities' home rule problems:
The proper approach, therefore, to a municipal authority problem is not to
determine whether such is authorized by statute, but rather to proceed on
the basis that the function is authorized by the Home Rule Amendment
and then determine whether such function can be restricted by the state
Legislature and, if so, whether the Legislature has in fact restricted the
manner in which such function can be carried out.
DiBella v. Village of Ontario, 212 N.E.2d 679, 682 (Ohio 1965).
599 S.W.2d at 170.
62 Id. at 172.

The Court eloquently stated its concern:
The authority to subpoena witnesses and compel them to give evidence is
too powerful, and too susceptible of abuse to be implied in the absence of
utter necessity. It is a tool of inquisition, short only of the rack and screw.

'3
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The Court concluded that the subpoena power could not
be implied incident to the Board's legislative investigatory
functions, even in light of the principles set forth by the
United States Supreme Court in McGrain v.Daugherty.6 In

McGrain, the Court recognized the right of Congressional
committees to use subpoenas as a necessary implication following from the need to investigate in order to obtain sufficient information to legislate intelligently. The same logic has
been applied to cases involving the extension of the subpoena
power to state legislative bodies.6 5 The Court of Appeals of
Kentucky was apparently willing to extend this line of reasoning to the next lowest legislative level and to allow the legislative body of a first class city to exercise the subpoena power
as a necessary implication of its power to investigate.6 6 The
Kentucky Supreme Court, however, was unwilling to make
this extension,67 noting that "it is a far cry from the halls of
Congress to town council." 68
Even in the hands of a grand jury it can be and sometimes is used in a
manner so oppressive as to seem inconsistent with the high value of individual liberty which is traditional in this country. Certainly it has no justifiable basis as an instrument to build a case of civil misconduct.
Id. at 171.
64 See note 15 supra for a discussion of the role of McGrain at the federal level.
5 See note 32 supra for a discussion of the applicability of the McGrain rationale to state legislative bodies.
"6Maupin v. Stansbury, 575 S.W.2d at 695. See note 32 supra for a discussion of
the court of appeals decision.
17 Justice Clayton indicated in his dissent that he was willing to extend the McGrain principle to a local government legislative body. 599 S.W.2d at 172 (Clayton, J.,
dissenting).
68 Id. Although the Kentucky Court expressed doubt as to the wisdom of allowing a local legislative body to possess the subpoena power, this power has been
exercised in similar circumstances by legislative investigating committees. See, e.g.,
Eggers v. Kenny, 104 A.2d at 10 (upholding a subpoena issued by investigating committee of Board of Commissioners of New Jersey in the investigation of a fellow commissioner); Wintermute v. Ellenstein, 187 A. 764 (N.J. 1936) (upholding subpoena
issued by investigating committee of Board of Commissioners of City of Newark to
the city prosecutor); LaGuardia v. Smith, 288 N.Y. 1 (1942) (holding mayor not immune under a separation of powers theory from a subpoena duces tecum issued by
investigative committee of a city council); Herlands v. Surpless, 16 N.Y.S.2d 454,
aff'd, 26 N.E.2d 800 (N.Y. 1940) (upholding a subpoena procured under the city charter, not under the existing statutory authority, by a special committee of the city
council to investigate administration of relief funds); Leahy v. City of Knoxville, 245
S.W.2d 772 (Tenn. 1952) (upholding subpoena duces tecum issued by city council in
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The Court recognized only one other way that the Board
might possess the subpoena power-as a necessary implication of the need to carry out an expressed power. In this connection, it examined the removal statute, KRS section 83.660,
and determined that the subpoena power might be implied for
the actual removal proceedings but not for a pre-removal investigation (presumably because such a pre-removal investigation is not expressly mentioned in the statute).,9
A.

The Court's Adherence to Tradition: The Dillon Rule

The Court showed its lack of understanding of the concept of home rule by justifying its refusal to extend the
McGrain principle to a city board of aldermen with the statement that "[tihe powers of a city have generally been confined
to those expressly delegated to it by the General Assembly."7 0
Although this is a valid statement in regard to a non-home

rule city, it has no place in an analysis of a home rule city
relation to an investigation of city employees).
Although these cases are instances in which there was express statutory authority
for the subpoena power exercised by the legislative investigating committee, they are
evidence that such committees have valid needs for the subpeona power. They also
demonstrate that the courts in these states were not overly fearful that a local body
would necessarily abuse the power. In fact, the Wintermute court indicated its feeling
that such powers were necessary when it stated:
This, however, is a case where those charged with the administration of the
affairs of the city of Newark desire to question, under oath, a deputy commissioner with respect to his official conduct in a public office. To deny
such power would be to deny to the municipality good government.
187 A. at 765.
The same New Jersey court, in the Eggers case, stated its reason for not fearing
the abuse of the subpoena power by a local government as follows: "It may be assumed that where a municipal investigating body is acting in bad faith or without any
legitimate public ends it will judicially be considered as exceeding its delegated statutory functions; our courts have unhesitatingly struck dovm arbitrary use of municipal
power in innumerable fields." 104 A.2d at 19.
61 599 S.W.2d at 172.
70 Id. In support of this conclusion, the Court cited the pre-home rule case of
Griffin v. City of Paducah, 382 S.W.2d 402 (Ky. 1964). The Court in this instance
should have heeded a warning of the Ohio courts in regard to using old non-home
rule cases as support for home rule problems. One Ohio court noted that
"[f]requently a court decision, like the light from a star that no longer exists, still
appears, but time has removed the justification for its existence as a source of authority." DiBella v. Village of Ontario, 212 N.E.2d at 682.
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problem. 7 1 The Court's position is not surprising, however,
since this is the rule of law that prevailed in regard to all cities prior to the enactment of home rule. It has apparently
been firmly etched into the minds of the Kentucky judiciary
as the proper disposition of these types of cases. 72
The rule of law that has been historically applied in construing conflicts between non-home rule municipal corporations and state legislatures (and which some courts mistakenly
still apply to home rule cities) was first enunciated in 1868 in
Iowa by Judge Dillon and is commonly referred to as the
Dillon Rule. It stipulates that:
[a] municipal corporation possesses and can exercise the following powers and no others: First, those granted in express
words; second, those necessarily implied or necessarily incident to the powers expressly granted; third, those absolutely
essential to the declared objects and purposes of the corporation-not simply convenient, but indispensible; fourth,
any fair doubt as to the existence of a power is resolved by
the courts against the corporation-against the existence of
the power. 73
When the Dillon Rule is adhered to, the city must go to the
legislature each time it faces a new problem. 4 It is precisely
to avoid this situaton that home rule laws are enacted.
The Kentucky Supreme Court's unwillingness to accept a
change in the traditional manner of dealing with local governments can be seen in the recent case of Fiscal Court v. City of
7, See notes 55-60 supra and accompanying text for a discussion of the Kentucky

statutory provisions.
712The Kentucky Court reaffirmed this long-held rule in regard to non-home rule
cities as recently as 1976 in Bowling Green v. Gasoline Marketers, Inc., 539 S.W.2d
281 (Ky. 1976). There it held that "[a] municipal corporation possesses no powers
except those expressly granted or those essential to the accomplishment of its de-

clared objectives and purposes." Id. at 284.
73 Merriam v. Moody's Ex'rs, 25 Iowa 163, 170 (1868), quoted in Bechtel v. City

of Des Moines, 225 N.W.2d at 328.
74

Hodes capsulizes the Dillon Rule by observing that "two salient principles are

invoked to restrict cities-the principle of express authority from the state, and the
canon of strict construction against the city." B. HODES, supra note 38, at 44. See also
Comment, The Dillon Rule-A Limit on Local Government Powers, 41 Mo. L. Rv.
546 (1976).
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Louisville,75 which called upon the Court to interpret home
rule legislation for counties. In finding that the General Assembly had made an overly broad delegation of powers to the
counties and that the act was therefore unconstitutional, the
Court based its decision on the determination that
"[t]radition establishes that county government in Kentucky
is based on the premise that all power exercised by the fiscal
court must be expressly delegated to it by statute." ' 6 Although the Court's frankness is commendable, tradition can
no longer serve as a rational basis for decisions in the area of
local government." The Legislature abandoned this tradition
when it enacted the Home Rule Act for first class cities. It is
time for the courts to do likewise.
It is quite clear that in Stansbury, the Court was motivated by an overriding concern over the subpoena power's
susceptibility to abuse. Its decision therefore reflected a policy
determination that the state legislature should have to delegate the power of subpoena expressly. 8 Although the Court's
concern regarding the casual extension of the subpoena power
can be readily appreciated, it resulted in the complete neglect
of the home rule question, which should have been the starting point for the entire analysis. 9 In so doing, the Court restrained the scope of the subpoena power, while establishing
choking precedent for one of the most important pieces of legislation for local governments in Kentucky.
" 559 S.W.2d 478 (Ky. 1977).

" Id. at 481.
11 Reverence for tradition was strongly renounced as a basis for legal decisions by
Justice Holmes in 1897:

It is revolting to have no better reason for a rule of law than that so it was
laid down in the time of Henry IV. It is still more revolting if the grounds
upon which it was laid down have vanished long since, and the rule simply
persists from blind imitation of the past.

0. W. HOLMES, The Path of the Law, in

COLLECTED LEGAL PAPERS 187 (1920).
78 The Kentucky Court would have been well-advised to follow the course enun-

ciated by the Oregon Supreme Court in considering the home rule question. That
court declared that "the court's decision must be derived from a constitutional standard, not from the court's own view of competing public policies." City of La Grande
v. Public Emp. Retirement Bd., 576 P.2d at 1210.
"' See note 58 supra and accompanying text for a relevant discussion.
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B. The Proper Analysis Under the Home Rule Act
In order to evaluate the scope of home rule legislation
properly, the circumstances giving rise to the need for such
legislation must be kept in mind. Case law in states with histories of home rule reflects that the underlying reason for
home rule is to alleviate burdens placed on the city and the
legislature by a system that requires specific enabling legislation in order for urban governments properly to address new
or unique problems.8 0 The real thrust of most home rule provisions is, therefore, to make the city as completely independent as possible in regard to purely local matters.8 1 It is this
central purpose of the legislation that must always be the
starting point for an analysis of home rule legislation, and it is
this purpose that the Kentucky courts have thus far ignored
in their decisions.
The Kentucky General Assembly obviously was aware of
the underlying purpose of the Act, as evidenced by the language of the Act itself. KRS section 83.410 provides:
(1) This chapter is intended by the general assembly of the
commonwealth of Kentucky to grant to citizens living within
a city of the first class the authority to govern themselves to
the full extent required by local government ....
(3) The provisions of this chapter shall be broadly construed
(4) The powers herein granted are based upon a legislative
finding that the urban crisis cannot be solved by actions of
the general assembly alone, and that the most effective
agency for the solution of these problems is the government
of a city of the first class. This legislative finding is based
" See, e.g.,

Mollner v. City of Omaha, 98 N.W.2d 33, 36 (Neb. 1959) (declaring

that reason for home rule is "to render such cities as nearly independent as possible
of state legislation"); City of La Grande v. Public Emp. Retirement Bd., 576 P.2d at
1208 (declaring object of home rule to be "to allow the people of the locality to decide
upon the organization of their government ... without having to obtain statutory
authorization from the legislature"). See also Fordham, Ohio Constitutional Revision- What of Local Government? 33 OHIO ST. L.J. 575, 579-80 (1972).

I" See State v. City of Lincoln, 288 N.W. 499 (Neb. 1939) (holding that the legislature cannot affect powers of a home rule city in regard to matters of purely local
concern).
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upon hearings held by the general assembly and the conclusion of its members that conditions found in cities of the
first class are sufficiently different from those found in other
cities to necessitate this grant of authority and complete
82
home rule.

If the Supreme Court had not adhered to the tradition
embodied in the Dillon Rule and had instead taken heed of
the legislative language,83 its analysis in Stansbury would necessarily have been vastly different. A proper analysis under
the Kentucky Home Rule Act requires analysis of both the
imperio and the NLC model characteristics of the Act. To satisfy the standard imposed under the imperio doctrine, the
first question to be addressed is whether the matter in question is of purely local concern.84 There can be little doubt that
the removal of a mayor is exactly the kind of problem in
which the state has no discernible interest. The members of
the General Assembly who live in Paducah or Pikeville surely
should have little, if any, input into the removal of a Louisville city official. Furthermore, the removal of such an official
will have virtually no impact on the citizens of Paducah and
Pikeville. It is therefore evident that this is precisely the type
of problem that the Home Rule Act was designed to leave to
local governments. 5
The next analytical step, in recognition of the NLC-type
provision in the Kentucky Home Rule Act, is the determination of whether there is any state legislation expressly prohibiting the local government from having this power.86 This is
the point of the analysis at which the courts and the Attorney
General, in their adherence to the traditional analysis, are in
error. Rather than determining whether the power is expressly
82 KRS § 83.410 (1980) (emphasis added).
83 See notes 68-72 supra and accompanying

text for a relevant discussion.
See notes 51-52 supra and accompanying text for a discussion of the imperio
doctrine. See also ANTIEAU, supra note 1, at § 3.22.
85 The structure of municipal government is generally considered a matter of local concern. Matters relating to public health and safety, however, are generally considered matters of statewide concern. See generally 2 E. MCQUILLEN, THE LAW OF
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS § 4.29 (3d ed. 1979).
88 See notes 53-54 & 57-60 supra and accompanying text for a discussion of
NLC-type provisions.
84
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granted,s7 the courts should be determining whether the
power is expressly prohibited.The answer in this case is obviously a negative one, since there is no legislation addressing
the Board's right to the power of subpoena.
Thus, the proper conclusion under the home rule analysis
is that since it is a purely local matter that is not expressly
prohibited by a state statute, it is a power that the local government enjoys under the Home Rule Act. In contrast to the
Supreme Court's analysis, if the Legislature does not want the
city to possess this power, it can expressly legislate to that
effect. The Court's fear of setting precedent that would allow
the subpoena power to be obtained by implication was misplaced in this instance. A proper analysis and understanding
of the Home Rule Act would have clearly established the
source of the city's power as arising from the Home Rule Act,
and there would have been no need for concern about setting
procedent for an implied power.""
CONCLUSION

The problems of governing a large urban area are too
complex today to tie first class cities to ancient rules of construction and methods of dealing with their problems. Nineteenth century concepts do not adequately address twentieth
century problems. No longer should a first class city government be tied to the apron strings of the state legislature. No
longer should the Dillon Rule be treated as if engraved in
'7The Wisconsin Supreme Court, called upon to interpret home rule legislation
similar to Kentucky's, declared that a home rule city's powers "shall be limited only
by express language. Since the enactment of ch. 62, Stats., such cities possess all powers not denied them by the statutes or the constitution. Instead of the powers being
specified, as formerly, the limitations are now enumerated." Beardsley v. City of Darlington, 111 N.W.2d at 186-87.
*The Texas Supreme Court has aptly noted in this regard that "[a]lthough the
broad powers granted to home rule cities by the Constitution, Article XI, Section 5,
Vernon's Ann. St., may be limited by acts of the Legislature, it seems that should the

Legislature decide to exercise that authority, its intention to do so should appear with
unmistakable clarity. City of Sweetwater v. Geron, 380 S.W.2d 550 (Tex. 1964) (emphasis added).
" The language of the Act in KRS § 83.520 giving the city all the power the
legislature could give it "as if expressly enumerated herein" is a direct grant and
should in no way be considered an implied grant within the McGrain analysis.
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stone. The General Assembly took a giant step forward by enacting the 1972 Home Rule Act. Unfortunately, the Supreme
Court counteracted this enlightened approach by its giant
step backwards in the Stansbury decision. Kentucky's first
class cities have been given an opportunity by the Legislature
to shoulder the responsibility for their own fates. This opportunity has been gravely threatened by judicial decisions that
are contrary to the Legislature's intent in enacting the Kentucky Home Rule Act. The courts are doing the cities and the
state a disservice by refusing to allow them to take advantage
of this opportunity.
Judith Adams Villines

